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VI. Redefinition Reviewed: What ‘Toward a
Redefinition of Sex and Gender’ Can Offer Today
Rose CAPDEVILA
Although I became familiar with Rhoda Unger’s work a decade ago while I was
a postgraduate student, I only recently came to read ‘Toward a Redefinition of
Sex and Gender’ (1979). Coming to it almost 30 years after it was published, and
being already familiar with her later work, of course, provides one with a some-
what different point of engagement. In a sense, I cannot help but see the paper as
the first steps taken on the road to a prolific, distinguished and influential career
that has contributed much to feminist psychology. Yes, inescapably, the paper is
the product of a particular time and of a particular matrix of debates, being, as it
was, part of a wider move in feminist writing to problematize the relationship
between gender and sex (see also Kessler and McKenna, 1978). It probably falls
most neatly into the tradition that Wilkinson, in her review of five feminist 
challenges to mainstream psychology, identifies as the ‘Mismeasure of women’
(1997). Indeed, Unger herself in 1996 grouped the paper primarily as a criticism
of method, along with those of Weisstein (1993[1968]), Sherif (1979) and
Wallston (1981).
While one could suppose that this might consign the paper to the drawer
marked ‘of historical interest’, I would argue that this would be a serious under-
estimation of the role the arguments proposed in the paper play within current
feminist endeavours, particularly pedagogical ones. Whereas those who have a
broad knowledge of feminist scholarship might feel that we have moved beyond
some of the points raised by the paper, I would contend that a substantial audi-
ence remains who might gain much from its reading. As a university lecturer, the
audience to which I refer is that made up by undergraduate students. Year upon
year, students arrive full of enthusiasm and, at the first opportunity in their
research methods workshops, they unthinkingly and unquestioningly include
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gender as a variable in all variations of data collection with nary a rationale or
explanation. Most of these students would struggle to get their heads around more
recent presentations of feminist theorizations and analytics in psychology that
have moved away from such fundamental and important critiques of the main-
stream. That is to say, I believe this paper provides a stable bridge that can take
one from mainstream psychology to the very questions that I, and I suspect many
of my feminist colleagues, struggle to make relevant to students in our teaching.
There are a number of points where, without a doubt, the paper shows its age.
At the time the ‘psychology of women’ was a relatively new field (e.g. Miller,
1976) and still relied heavily on ‘the master’s tools’ and, thus, positivist dis-
course. As a result, terms such as ‘individual differences’, ‘variable’, ‘stimulus’
and ‘subject’, uncommon these days in much, particularly European and post-
structuralist, feminist psychology, are not problematized. The suggestion that
many sex differences, never mind sex categories themselves, might be social con-
structions was then relatively radical. Thus the sex/gender distinction on which
the paper focuses resonates far more strongly with the nature/nurture debates that
have plagued psychology from its inception than the essentialist/constructionist
approaches that, while emergent at the time, are more prevalent today.
Nonetheless, I would argue that the paper did, and does, a number of jobs and
it does them very well indeed. Part of the reason it is able to do this is because it
does play by the rules of mainstream psychology. Billig (1990) has argued that
social psychology, unlike many other disciplines, often argues explicitly against
common sense. In this way, psychological writing is expressly directed at an
audience with whom the author is always having an argument about validity. In
its challenge to established scientific tenets, ‘Toward a Redefinition of Sex and
Gender’ undoubtedly performs this task. It is carefully referenced and well 
documented and thus ‘does’ or ‘performs’ academic psychology very well. To be
precise, it very much follows the model for ‘fact making’ in psychology (Smyth,
2001). Moreover, its publication in a prestigious and widely read publication 
such as American Psychologist allows it to be positioned within mainstream 
discourses, while retaining the legitimacy of marginality. This in itself is no mean
feat!
The main argument, and in a sense hope, of the paper is that the conceptual
newness of the term ‘gender’ will make its use less likely to produce physiologi-
cal explanations for psychological differences between males and females. The
success of this venture is uncertain. Certainly, gender is a much more widely used
term (see Haig, 2004). However, a recent experience highlighted for me the
uncertainty of the beneficence of this outcome. When I asked students in a 
seminar recently about the sex/gender distinction, they appeared somewhat per-
plexed by my question. For them, using the word ‘sex’ in this way was simply an
outdated way of saying ‘gender’. Thus, while gender may well have become a
more prevalent term, this rise appears to have corresponded to a demise in the 
use of the term sex. Unger explicitly states in the paper that ‘the substitution of
gender for sex is not the solution to this problem. Both terms – appropriately
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defined – are necessary parts of our psychological vocabularies’ (1979: 1093
original).
Having said that, and while the main aim of the paper may not (yet?) have been
realized, in the process of pursuing this aim, it addresses a number of critical
points around psychology itself that I would argue are still highly relevant. First,
it questions the legitimacy of using group data to justify the treatment of individ-
uals (1979: 1092), which has lately, at least in the UK context, become ever more
prevalent. One need only consider the UK government’s attempts to pass a
Mental Health Act that allows for the incarceration of those identified with ‘per-
sonality disorders’ even when no crime has been committed.
Second, though not alone in this, ‘Toward a Redefinition of Sex and Gender’
performs a badly needed critique around the constitution of biological ‘sex’ dif-
ferences. This is an important pedagogical point to which the paper gives some
time. It offers a very coherent and cohesive presentation of the arguments and is
an excellent tool for getting students to discuss issues around positivism. This has
recently become more significant as, with the increasing popularity of evolution-
ary psychology, theorizations around ‘sex’ differences have, again, become more
prevalent. A recent text entitled Gender Differences in Mathematics (Gallagher
and Kaufman, 2005) takes a curious position on the very subject of its title. As
Crafter (2007) has noted, while the book purports that there is little evidence of
what the editors call ‘a gender gap’ in mathematical ability, much of the book is
taken up with explaining this very ‘gap’ or, more accurately, the deficiencies to
be found in girls’ mathematical performance. Another current instantiation of
this, which at least UK students are bound to come across in their studies, would
be Baron-Cohen’s (2003) proposal of a ‘male’ and ‘female’ brain. While Baron-
Cohen (2005) recognizes that some women may have ‘male’ brains and some
men may have ‘female’ brains, he persists in identifying them as such and has
expressed some surprise, and indeed satisfaction, that feminists have not taken
him up on it.
Third, and I would argue most importantly, the paper highlights the signifi-
cance of engaging with these issues politically. Unger, in the second sentence 
of the paper, states: ‘The question of what is being studied would be of only aca-
demic interest except for the political and social implications of the results of
research in this area’ (1979: 1085). In other words, what makes this work impor-
tant are the implications of the processes it critiques. This is a far more 
consequentialist approach than has traditionally existed, and is still dominant in
mainstream psychologies that tend to limit responsibility to the adherence to a
series of set ethical guidelines (e.g. American Psychological Association, British
Psychological Society, etc.). ‘Toward a Redefinition of Sex and Gender’ ex-
plicitly recognizes the power in the (re)defining of terminology. While above I
mention some issues that have led me to question the beneficence of the ‘gender’
project, there are a number of indicators that it has, at least politically, had an
important impact. Gender theorized as a political concept rather than a scientific
one has meant that it need not always respond only to the needs of science. I must
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confess, it brings a smile to my face when I read of scientists (over)using the term
gender (e.g. Haig, 2004) because it represents, if not an engagement, at least an
awareness of the political – a recognition that language is not neutral and science
cannot be isolated from the broader context. This is an important point for those
students who have only ever been exposed to mainstream positivist psychology.
In ‘Toward a Redefinition of Sex and Gender’, Unger argues: ‘If fewer and
fewer sex differences can be unequivocally demonstrated . . . will the area cease
to be an interesting one?’ (1979: 1085 original). Evidently not. Moreover, unfor-
tunately, it would be difficult to argue that the paper has had the positive effect
hoped for in terms of understandings of sex and gender. However, I would con-
tend that this paper still serves as a stepping stone from mainstream thought to
current feminist conceptualizations for those coming to these ideas anew. It is the
three points presented earlier that I would argue make the paper, now as much 
as ever, a useful and effective pedagogical tool or introduction to feminist con-
ceptualizations within psychology. This is particularly true for those who are
unlikely to have come across these critiques within a mainstream education. In
the current climate in higher education, the issues raised by Unger are, even now,
relevant.
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